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Activities of Islamic civic associations in the Northwest of Nigeria: 
with particular reference to Kano State 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Islamic civic associations have been in the vanguard for the reclamation and reassertion of 
people’s power in Northern Nigeria. The relationship between the state and Islamic associa-
tions is not uni-linear; rather it is characterized by varying currents. Radical Islamic civic as-
sociations, for example, can connect and disconnect with the State without necessarily be-
ing compromised. Islamic civic associations lack the capacity to raise funds from within, thus 
they tend to rely on non-institutionalized philanthropy and handouts from the State. These 
associations do not receive any substantial funding from international or bilateral aid of 
Arab countries, as is generally thought by outsiders. Islamic civic associations engage in 
advocacy work to promote legitimate interests of the Islamic world in Northern Nigeria. The 
range of activities spreads from promoting good governance or girl-child education to 
women empowerment. These civics in Kano state do not possess the capacity, skills and 
training for social or general administration. Nevertheless, even community policing has 
been promoted by associations like Hisbah through its instrumentality in the detection of 
crimes, and the rule of law has been greatly helped with its formation. However, critics of 
Hisbah equate it with extra-legal justice, and certainly it has the potential to degenerate into 
that if care is not taken. 
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Introduction 
 
A culture of authoritarianism, occasioned by an authoritarian pattern of state rule in Nigeria, 
has produced a variety of regimes to which many Islamic civil society groups have equally 
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responded. Some responses have been cooperative or collaborative even consensual, while 
others have been conflictual. The nature of state deployment (or withholding) of resources to 
either the Islamic civil society associations or even the generality of the populace may have 
motivated such a variety of responses. Research on civic associations in Nigeria has largely 
been focused on those in urban areas (as a result of which these studies are either elitist, 
publicity seeking, etc.) or restricted to the southern part of the country. Therefore, there is a 
limited understanding of the rich variety, features and dynamics as well as the problems of 
civic associations in Kano state in general and of Islamic civic associations in particular.  
Islamic civic associations abound in Kano have engaged the state or its representa-
tives in various issues. The following study will answer specific questions, notably, why have 
the different Islamic civic associations been in conflict with the State? What has been the 
nature and form of these encounters or challenges? How have the different civic associations 
addressed social, economic and political issues in the community?  In addition, the study 
provides empirical data upon which the various undercurrents in the relationship State-/ Civic 
associations (Islamic) can be measured. As this is the first empirical investigation into this 
subject, it provides  baseline data for subsequent studies in this field. 
 
 
 
On the history of Islamic associations in northern Nigeria 
 
The British colonial empire viewed Northern Nigeria as belonging to peculiar circumstances 
(cf. Sulaiman 2001: 1). The term reflected a profound sense of consternation and frustration 
felt by the colonial power in its policies towards the Shariah Islamic law in Northern Nigeria. 
The colonial power had to contend with two realities. First, nowhere in the non-Arabic world 
was Shariah more extensively applied than in Northern Nigeria. Second, despite sixty years of 
colonial administration and in contrast to the general expectation that the process of mod-
ernization would definitely and conclusively seal the fate of Shariah, forcing it to wither away, 
there prevailed everywhere in Northern Nigeria, throughout the colonial and post-colonial 
era, a zeal for the restoration of the Shariah to its full extent. Beside Egypt, Nigeria has the 
largest concentration of Muslims on the African continent, even in the Arab world. 
On attainment of political independence, Nigeria was economically marginalized.  In 
part, this was due to the fact that colonialism had created a rent-seeking elite of consumption 
rather than an elite of productivity. 
 
“The post-colonial Nigerian elite was more adept at making money than creating 
wealth … the Nigerian elite had learnt the techniques of circulating money without a 
talent for creating new wealth. The colonial impact in Nigeria had generated urbaniza-
tion without industrialization, had fostered western consumption patterns without 
western productive techniques, had cultivated among Nigerians western tastes with-
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out western skills, had initiated secularization without the scientific spirit.” (Mazrui 
2001: 4) 
  
While Nigeria as a whole was on the perimeter of the world economy, Northern Nigeria 
formed a periphery within that perimeter being even less developed with regards to economy, 
infrastructure, and formal education. Northern Nigerians rejected being economically mar-
ginal, but also insisted on their cultural authenticity, due partly to Islam and partly to the 
colonial policy of indirect rule. Through its divide and rule strategy, the colonial government 
accommodated Islamic law and education in Northern Nigeria, but not in the Southwest which 
also had a substantial Muslim population.  
In order to provide Western education with Islamic content and orientation for Muslim 
children, Muslim missionary societies emerged in South western Nigeria and were character-
ized by an active participation of women. 
 
“Each missionary society had a vibrant women wing, which complemented the efforts 
of the men morally and financially. The women paid attention to tarbiyah (upbringing 
of children), fund-raising activities … some enlightened ones among the women 
even engaged in talks over the radio on topical issues. The schools established by 
Muslim missions were open to both boys and girls.” (Okunnu 2001: 3) 
 
The same did not apply to Northern Nigeria where, in general, girls and women were denied 
access to both Western and Islamic education. Thus, half of the population of the Muslim Ummah 
(community) remained in a state of ignorance, most vulnerable to poverty and oppression, and 
consigned to the fringes of life. This was condoned by the generality of ulama (Islamic religious 
and legal experts), despite statements by the 19th century scholar and founder of the Sokoto 
caliphate, Usman bin Fodio, who had advocated the (religious) education of women.1 
Secular education became established with the advent of colonial rule in Nigeria. The ini-
tial opposition by Muslims to the secular educational system gradually declined even in Northern 
Nigeria, with the opening of more schools, including those to girls. An organization called Muslim 
Students Society (MSS) was founded in Lagos in 1954 to act as an insulator to Muslim adoles-
cents from what was perceived as the negative aspects of secular education, especially an al-
leged decay in morale. At the same time, the MSS was to counter the Scripture Union (SU), a 
Christian organization and in addition to stop what was seen as the indoctrination of Muslim 
                                                          
1  In his Nur-Al-Bab, Usman bin Fodio stated: ‘Most of our educated men leave their wives, their daughters and 
their captives morally abandoned like beasts, without teaching them what Allah prescribes should be taught them 
and without instructing them in the articles of law which concern them. Thus, they leave them ignorant of the 
rules regarding ablution, prayers, fasting, business dealings and other duties which they have to fulfil and which 
Allah commands they should be taught.’ (Okunnu 2001: 4). Bin Fodio thus advised: ‘Muslim women, do not lis-
ten to the speech of those who are misguided … they deceive you when they stress obedience to your husband, 
without telling you of obedience to Allah and his messenger. They seek only their own satisfaction and that is why 
they impose upon you tasks which the law of Allah and that of the prophet have never especially assigned to you 
such as, preparation of food, the washing of clothes and other duties which they like to impose upon you, while 
they neglect to teach you what Allah and the prophet have prescribed for you.’ (ibid.) 
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children into Christianity by missionaries, especially in the Southwest. During the 1970s a ‘hard-
core extremist leadership’, based in the Northern universities of Zaria, Kano and Sokoto, took 
control allegedly fuelled by Iran’s revolution (Williams / Falola 1995: 178). The MSS membership 
spread throughout Nigeria and was effective as an organization that rallies Muslims, especially 
youths. So vibrant was the MSS that in secondary and tertiary institutions it gave impetus to other 
post-secondary and post-graduate organizations and movements to meet the challenges of the 
time. In a way the MSS provided the launching pad for the development of modern Islamic civic 
associations and movements. 
 
 
 
Civil society in the Northwest: an overview 
 
Civic associations in the Northwest of Nigeria manifest a peculiar duality. Civic associations 
can be located in the traditional or in the modern sphere; some of them straddle both 
spheres. Associations in the modern sphere are determined and upheld by the modern and 
universalistic characteristics such as shared interests, occupation, commitment etc. Associa-
tions in the traditional sphere are brought into existence and sustained by the communal 
nature of social cohesion and underpinned by shared particularistic features such as religion, 
ethnicity, social status, occupation, gender, etc. (See White 1994: 375-390, Young 1994: 
45). The colonial and post-colonial states show tendencies to intervene in the regulation and 
activities of civic associations in both spheres. 
There was a clear divide between traditional and modern civic associations in pre-
independence Northern Nigeria. One major distinguishing feature of the modern civic associa-
tions is that they were led by western educated elites who challenged the colonial administra-
tion through advocacy and the raising of political consciousness of the masses. A major 
initiator in enhancing political consciousness in the then Northern Region of Nigeria was the 
Kaduna Old Boys Association, formed in 1939. Thus, for example, the late Malam Aminu 
Kano, then a student at the college, staged an interesting play in Hausa depicting business 
transaction at a Kano market to entertain the visiting old boys. Colonial authorities viewed the 
play as being politically inspired, capable of doing more harm than good to the stability of the 
region (Imam 1989: 162). The play was probably the reason behind shelving the activities of 
the association for a while by the colonial authority. Aminu Kano was also instrumental in the 
formation in 1948 of the Northern Teachers Association. 
Similarly, the late Malam Sa’adu Zungur who had progressive ideas about the improve-
ment and development of Nigeria in general, and Northern Nigeria in particular, began to organ-
ize and later formed in 1940 an association called Zaria Friendly Society. Among other things, the 
association was to agitate for social reforms in the Northern Region, and to enlighten the Re-
gion’s people on political issues. Furthermore, members of the Northern educated elite led by Dr. 
R.A.B. Dikko founded a cultural association in 1948, called Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa. Later, its 
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Hausa name gave way to an English name, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) (ibid.: 168). 
Since the association was not declared a political party, the colonial authorities tactfully reminded 
the civil servants, who were members of the association, of the provisions stated in the relevant 
government orders. 
In 1945 Abubakar Imam founded a cooperative society called Take-Care of the Pence 
Society in Zaria. The aim of the association was to teach its members and Northerners in particu-
lar, thrift and frugality. The members of the association contributed one shilling monthly. With the 
collected funds a sort of cooperative shop was operated where members could buy commodities 
at reasonable prices (ibid.: 189). The history of modern civic associations in the Northern region 
during the pre-independence period, therefore, is almost analogous to the history of the accom-
plishments of the Western educated elites of Northern Nigeria. Civic associations were also active 
and vibrant in the traditional sections. Among them were the traders’ associations, as well as 
village and community associations as well as the powerful kola and groundnut traders associa-
tions, for example, the Kano Citizens Trading Association founded by Alhassan Dantata as early 
as 1912 (Lovejoy 1980). That association provided interest-free credit for younger traders. It 
should be noted that such associations are primarily commercially oriented.  
The 1970s was a period of oil boom and development fervour in Nigeria. In that period 
the community based organizations (CBOs) and cooperative societies in Northern Nigeria be-
came important conduits to ensure that some of the oil revenues trickled down to the grassroots, 
though substantial amounts still found their way into private pockets. 
The most fundamental changes that impacted on the nature and development of civic 
associations in the Northwest, and indeed in the whole of Nigeria, took place in the 1980s. It 
was a decade of increasing intervention by the state into both the traditional and modern 
spheres of civil society. The Nigerian state, ruled by a military dictator, General Babangida, 
sought to negotiate with critics and adversaries and to assert its legitimacy by creating and 
supporting selected civic associations both from the modern and traditional spheres. Thus 
General Babangida’s government supported traditional institutions such as the Association of 
Traditional Rulers and Women’s, the Jam’iyyar Matan Arewa (JMA) and the Association of 
Northern Women and the National Council of Women Societies (NCWS). At the same time, it 
opposed and even banned associations of workers, Muslim students and religious move-
ments. 
The government of General Abacha (1993-1998) further politicized civil societies. In 
the Northwest, as everywhere in the country, traditional rulers were courted or coerced to 
support government programs and objectives, especially General Abacha’s self-succession 
programs. An allocation of 5 percent of government's disbursement to local government 
councils was set-aside for councils of traditional rulers. General Abacha’s government took 
politicization of civil society a step further by cultivating and supporting a number of organi-
zations, which advocated his self-succession under the regime’s transition program. At the 
same time, however, the regime clamped down brutally on associations it found disagreeable, 
such as the Muslim Brothers of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and the Jama’at Tajdidul Islam of 
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Abubakar Muhammad Mujahid. 
With the return of the country to free elections and the swearing in of a democrati-
cally elected president (1999), the country in general is witnessing a proliferation of civic 
associations of all shades and character. Especially in the Northwest the promulgation of 
Shariah law led to an increase of Islamic associations. 
Today, the states of the Northwest – a zone based on agriculture, characterized by pov-
erty, with Hausa as the majority language and Islam the dominant religion – share common forms 
of civic associations. These include, for example, religious organizations, which engage in advo-
cacy, social provisioning and literacy work. Non-institutionalized philanthropical and self-help 
development associations and cooperative groups are the main forms of community-based 
organizations. Additional features of commonality are the strong involvement of Emirate Councils 
and other traditional institutions in development issues. The Evangelical Church of West Africa 
(ECWA) has emerged as a pan-northern Christian association providing health care, socio-
psychological and welfare services to the substantial minority of Christians in this zone. The 
Islamic civic associations apprehend their objectives and activities from within Islam as the culture 
and traditions of the North, for instance are practised through informal philanthropy, i.e. social 
provisioning is based on Zakkat in which the wealthy pays to alleviate poverty. In addition the 
Islamic dictate 'be your brothers keeper' and the responsibility of a wealthy person towards his 
neighbour etc. are  major issues of advocacy of Islamic civic associations. These associations 
enjoy tremendous legitimacy in civil society and so possess the potential to become agents of 
social change. Furthermore, after the withdrawal of the state from provisioning and other social 
services such as health care and education, Islamic associations have succeeded in providing 
education (western and Islamic) and other social safeguards to the less privileged and socially 
marginalized. To the poor of the Northwest, therefore, this is a sign of commitment towards 
alleviating material poverty and poverty of knowledge. 
The Northwest also has a variety of modern civic associations, i.e. the cooperative 
associations commonly referred to as ‘Multipurpose Cooperatives’ and ‘Self-Help Develop-
ment Associations’, which are found both in the rural and urban areas. One of the positive 
characteristics of these groups is that they do not practice gender segregation; in fact, their 
activities can hardly be executed successfully without the active participation of their female 
members. Furthermore, self-help development associations work closely with the state (spe-
cially the local government councils) and have strong links with the grassroots. Their activities 
range from renovation and building of drainages to conflict resolutions and the building of 
schools and mosques, whereby the state provides the logistics and other implements. The 
state mobilizes these groups to support its programs, for example immunization programs or 
the registration of voters. 
Other manifestations of modern civic associations are the more formal Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which are mainly supported by western international 
donor agencies. The majority of these groups focus on reproductive health and HIV/AIDS 
control and prevention. The success of their engagements is often affected by their poor links 
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to the communities where they are located. Generally people that are not indigenous to the 
communities and have little grassroots support run most of these NGOs. To complicate mat-
ters, some NGO projects usually  take place in a very sensitive area, i.e. reproductive health. 
As these NGOs are usually regarded as lobbyists for family planning, the community is very 
suspicious of them. The fact that the leaders of these NGOs are mostly Christians does not 
simplify matters. A survey of formal and most dominant health NGOs in Kano, Kebbi and 
Jigawa States supported by western donors reveals that NGOs react to community hostility by 
simply switching their attention to the non-indigenous population living in the North. This 
practice takes place despite the fact that the legal wording of grants specifically identifies 
local communities as the prime beneficiaries (Hashim / Walker 1999: 17). Furthermore, the 
democratic credentials of the leaders of these NGOs are suspect. In fact, these associations 
are more of NGIs i.e. Non-Governmental Individuals rather than NGOs, for example, some of 
these NGOs have it written in their constitution that the office of the president of the organi-
zation is for life, and in some others the organization is staffed by relatives or family mem-
bers. A keen observer would notice that such organizations are run by the same people year-
in-and-year-out without any change of leadership of the organization. A fundamental problem 
faced by western supported NGOs in the Northwest is the community’s suspicion of Western 
precepts and models of development. Many people view the Western model of development 
as simply an attempt at westernization. Especially Islamic associations tend to mobilize 
against the forces of globalization and their westernizing influences. Most officials of civic 
associations in the Northwest work part-time, although holding full-time jobs with either the 
state or local government. This trend is more pronounced amongst self-help development 
associations, cooperative groups and old boys associations. Such divisions of loyalty impact 
negatively on the performance and sustainability of these associations.  
Despite the commonalities of civic associations in the Northwest, differences exist be-
tween the states. In Kano, Jigawa and Sokoto, for instance, conservative traditions pose great 
obstacles to civic associations that seek to reach women. This contrasts with the more open 
states of Katsina and Kaduna. Furthermore, resistance to western donors support is less 
intense in such states as Kaduna and Birnin Kebbi, probably due to the multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious character of those states. 
 
 
 
Resurgence of Islamic reform activities 
 
Since the late 1970s, Northern Nigeria has witnessed a resurgence of Islamic religious move-
ments. This process has culminated in the introduction of the Shariah penal code in 12 Northern 
Nigerian states since late 1999. Contemporary Islamic religious movements in Nigeria, however, 
should be seen in the context of Islamic reform activities which galvanized parts of the present 
day West African sub-region in the 17th and 18th centuries into a series of Jihads. The Jihad, led 
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by the Islamic scholar Usman Bin Fodio, and supported by a revolutionary vanguard from among 
the Islamic intelligentsia (in 1804) led to the creation of the Sokoto caliphate, which remains an 
important point of reference for Nigerian Muslims today. 
Up to the end of the 19th century, when British imperialists imposed their rule, the 
Shariah Islamic law was deeply entrenched as the dominant legal, social and political order in the 
caliphate which made up a considerable part of today’s Northern Nigeria, as well as some 
neighboring areas. The Shariah came to occupy this position through its efficacy in social trans-
formation and promotion of social justice. When the British conquered their lands at the beginning 
of the 20th century and imposed their rule, Northern Nigerian Muslims entertained considerable 
fears about the dangers to which their religion and culture were exposed. This, to a large extent, 
motivated their resistance and determination to preserve Islam and Shariah. 
 
“The British colonial rulers were fully aware of the religious concerns which motivated re-
sistance, and the extent and level of Muslim convictions in the Sharia and its institutions.  
They also recognized what serious obstacles these were to their colonial designs, which 
were not limited to physical conquest but extended to bringing the conquered people un-
der their cultural hegemony. With regards to the Sharia they at first pursued a cautious 
policy of accommodation, reassuring Muslims of their commitment to preserve Islamic re-
ligious institutions. Lord Lugard, the first British high commissioner of northern Nigeria, 
gave the commitment of the colonial government not to interfere with Islam, and under-
took to ‘uphold the power of the native courts to deal with native cases according to the 
law and custom of the country’. British policy was therefore a gradual process of trans-
formation and subjugation. A cardinal aim of this policy was the subordination and secu-
larization of Sharia courts, for which two strategies appear to have been employed. First, 
… Sharia courts were expected to gradually imbibe, adopt and assimilate to colonial laws 
and procedures based on the English law. Through the supervision and tutoring of colo-
nial officers, English law and its legal methods were expected to replace Islamic law in the 
courts. Secondly, colonial policy aimed to place the administration of the Sharia firmly un-
der the control and supervision of the British colonial courts. The process started cau-
tiously in 1933, and gradually took a more open and determined trend. … The meas-
ures taken undermined the prestige, efficiency and credibility which the Shariah courts 
hitherto enjoyed. The Alkali courts were debased and demoralized to the extent that at a 
certain stage many learned and respectable persons avoided being appointed judges. 
Furthermore colonial policy achieved the total subordination of the Shariah to the appel-
late and supervisory powers of the British-type courts. Judges of these courts assumed 
power as the final arbiters on all questions of Islamic law.” (Tabiu 2001: 5-6) 
 
Religious movements in the colonial and post-colonial eras have been essentially an outcry 
against social contradictions arising from political and economic crises in society. According to 
Chafe (1992), during the colonial period little attention was paid to the activities of religious 
movements due to, three reasons: 
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“In the first place, the colonial era disarticulated internal dynamics of social development. 
Secondly, the failure of the Sokoto caliphate to transform new forms of social relations in 
the course of the nineteenth century before its conquest by the British colonial aggres-
sors this did create some setback on the fluidity of Islamic reform activities. Thirdly, the 
colonial policies, largely executed through the same structures created by the Sokoto ca-
liphate, were very apprehensive of the revolutionary character of religious movements, 
and therefore sought to strategically  curtail their influence.” (Chafe 1992: 8) 
 
By religion, history and culture, and on account of holding a set of common aspirations, Muslims 
in Northern Nigeria form a distinct group. Although in Nigeria individuals claim a variety of concur-
rent identities, ethnic, religious and regional, for most Northern Nigerian Muslims the Islamic 
identity is paramount. This is of course in line with the demand of the Islamic faith that believers 
constitute a single Ummah (community) and which subsumes and stands above all divisions. The 
assertion of Islamic identity is however more pronounced among Muslims in the Northwest zone 
of Nigeria, essentially because the religious identity is supported and consolidated by common 
geographical location, political and cultural background and historical experience. 
Islam, and by extension Shariah, is one of the dominant elements which have been 
woven into the Northwest’s distinct identity. The British colonial government took the decision in 
the 1950s to introduce the federal system as a solution to the problem of co-existence among 
the different entities that made up Nigeria. This was necessary to avoid conflicts and frictions by 
allowing sufficient autonomy to the constituent parts to pursue their various local interests and 
peculiarities. For Muslims in the Northwest zone of Nigeria sustaining the Islamic cultural identity 
was an important reason for choosing federalism. The opportunity to organize their affairs in 
accordance with the teachings of the Shariah was at the forefront of considerations for subscrib-
ing to federalism. According to Professor Tabiu, for two reasons the Shariah occupies a prime 
position as a collective concern of Nigerian Muslims. 
 
“The first is the well-known fact that implementing the Shariah to realize its inherent 
benefits is the dominant aspiration of all true believers. Described as ‘the core and kernel 
of Islam’, the Shariah is at one and the same time a legal system, code of ethics, a sym-
bol of national identity and a unifying ideal. [It is] offering guidance to humanity in all as-
pects of life, embodying rules of personal ethics and morality, a scheme of political or-
ganization, a program of social justice and guidelines for spiritual advancement. In its 
various roles, the Sharia occupies a central position in Muslim life, religion and culture. 
The second reason is the important place that the Shariah occupies in the Nigerian Mus-
lims historical experience.” (Tabiu 2001: 4) 
 
Northwestern Nigerian Muslims and indeed Nigerian Muslims as a whole have never overtly or 
covertly accepted the triumph of colonial policy in undermining the Shariah and subordinating its 
judicial system. The changes introduced at independence in 1960 to replace part of Islamic law 
were not with the free consent of the Muslim Ummah (community) (in the sense that the Northern 
political elites who took over power from the colonial rulers did not consult the people before 
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embarking on such a venture). In all subsequent occasions of drafting or approving a constitution 
for the country Muslims have voiced their aspirations to see the Shariah being reinstated in the 
areas where it was displaced. This was the case in the 1977/78 debates that preceded the 1979 
and subsequent constitutions. This captures the persistent struggle of Muslims to reverse the 
deeds of the colonial imperialist policy and to remove restrictions that impede the meaningful 
administration of the Shariah. 
In the post-colonial era, in the late 1970s, Northern Nigeria began to witness the resur-
gence of Islamic religious movements. By this period internal conditions as well as external events 
began to influence the growth and proliferation of Islamic reform activities. Internally, political 
developments between 1978 and 1983 were generating large-scale corruption and political 
thuggery among elites, while at the same time these conditions were promoting social acrimony 
and economic emasculation among the lower classes and socially excluded groups. As the proc-
ess of political and economic crises were deepening internally, the Islamic revolution in Iran 
introduced a fundamental external impetus on the nature and organizational structure of Islamic 
reform activities. The success of the Iranian revolution also facilitated an ideological split among 
leaders of the emerging religious groups. As a result the politically active members of youth wings 
emerged into a formidable pro-Iranian group. 
It is important at this juncture to clarify the fundamental distinction between Islamic 
religious movements and Islamic civic associations. Islamic religious movements are revolu-
tionary, seeking to establish a new social order articulated in consonance with the provisions 
of Shariah though on a varying degree of ideological inclination and tactical approach. On the 
other hand Islamic civic associations engage in social provisioning, advocating good govern-
ance and also acting as pressure groups that seek to influence government to carry out 
certain activities be it social, political or economic. Our focus is on Islamic civic associations. 
 
 
 
Islamic Civic Associations in Kano2 
 
Kano derived its name from the ancestor of the Abagayawa (the earliest settler), who mi-
grated from Gaya in search of ironstone and chemical (Booth-Musa 1988). Hausa is the most 
widely spoken language. The early settlers were traditional animists whose lives were centerd 
on the shrine of Tsumburbura (Zahraddeen 1983). The state’s population is predominantly 
                                                          
2 This part of the article is mainly based on the author’s fieldwork since 1998 and forms part of a larger on-going 
research work. The author conducted a profiling of civil society organizations in Kano state in 1998 while working 
on the CRD/ICSAG research network. He also was the program officer for the CRD/ICSAG profiling exercise in Ni-
geria. In 1999/2000, he and Sulaiman Khalid carried out a research on the activities of civil society organizations 
in the northwest zone of Nigeria. The research was funded by CRD/ICSAG governance project. The author is cur-
rently undergoing a doctoral degree in the area of State-Islamic civil society relationship. Most of the current 
information and interviews in this article came from his field work. 
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Hausa and Fulani; the Nupe and Kanuri natives occupy distinct tracts of the old city. Yorubas 
and Igbos are many in the state. The Lebanese and Arab communities have been more easily 
assimilated into the culture of the Kanawa because of their affinity in trade and Islamic back-
ground. The state was first created under this name on 27th of May 1967, when Nigeria 
assumed the 12 state divisions. In terms of its administrative structure the state has 44 local 
government areas with Kano as the capital. Its administrative machinery revolves around the 
executive, the legislature, the local government councils and the traditional administration. 
The traditional authority is executed by the Emirate council with the Emir as its president. The 
role of the council includes: harmonizing the activities of the local government councils 
through discussions of problems of mutual concern, to determine religious matters and 
customary laws, make representation and express opinions to government and other organi-
zations on matters of importance to the Emirate or brought to the Emirate council by gov-
ernment or other organizations (Ibid: 5).  
In their everyday life Muslims in Kano State are getting guidance on various aspects 
of their lives from Islamic groups and associations or from Islamic leaders. The issues that 
are selected for discussions, those that are condemned or ignored and the contents of the 
suggestions or interventions are always based on religious precepts and beliefs. The Kano 
state has a predominance of Islamic civic associations. The main focus of Islamic civic asso-
ciations in the state is that of securing for their members the right to freedom of worship and 
expression, their right to decent lives and their political and social empowerment.  
One major distinguishing feature of Islamic civic associations in the state is the divide be-
tween orthodox and pro-state, and radical and anti-state factions. However, there are a few 
associations that straddle the two extremes.  
Groups such as the Council of Ulama, Fityanul Islam, Islamic Foundation, Qadiriyya 
and Tijjaniyya brotherhoods are traditional and pro-state. The Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya Tariqas 
are the only Sufi brotherhoods of importance in Kano. Their development and struggles 
against each other had a decisive influence on the formation of Islam in Nigeria. Whereas the 
Qadiriyya Tariqa had been present in Hausaland for several centuries and had played an 
important role in the Jihad of 1804-08, the Tijjaniyya Tariqa was introduced only in the nine-
teenth century (Loimeier 1997: 19). The Tariqa’s activities were mainly aimed at the revitali-
zation (tajdid) of the religion of Islam. This quest for the tajdid influenced the development of 
Islamic society in Hausaland since Islam reached this region.  
Through the Jihad, the Sufi brotherhood of the Qadiriyya was established as the 
quasi-official Tariqa of the Sokoto empire (Brenner 1988: 47). All leaders of the Jihad were 
followers of the Qadiriyya, Abdul Qadir Jailani was their “patron saint” and till today all follow-
ers of the Qadiriyya see Jailani as their “patron saint”. The most renowned scholar and leader 
of the Qadiriyya in Nigeria, from the 1950s up to his death in late 1990s, was Nasiru Kabara, 
whose house is directly opposite the Emir’s palace in Kano. Qaribullah succeeded his father 
as the head of the Qadiriyya Tariqa. In the course of the Sokoto Jihad settlement the Qadiri-
yya Tariqa did not assume the function as the official ideology center for the empire 
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(Ibid: 44).  
Al-Hajj Umar Tal Al-Futi introduced the Tijjaniyya Tariqa into the present day Northern 
Nigeria. On his way back from the Hajj (pilgrimage) he stayed in Borno and in Sokoto from 
1831/32 to 1838 (Robinson 1985: 97). The Qadiriyya Tariqa lost its spiritual monopoly with 
the introduction of the Tijjaniyya Tariqa. It was however the weakening of the central author-
ity, as a result of the conquest of the Sokoto Empire by the British, that led to the expansion 
of the Tijjaniyya Tariqa. The British in Nigeria originally mistrusted the Tijanis on account of 
their collaboration with the Sultan of Sokoto (Attahiru). Because of their bad experiences with 
the Mahdi in the Sudan the British in the early twentieth century were suspicious, as the work 
of Garba (1983) shows, and saw “mahdist” machinations behind almost every religious 
movement which resisted them or did not collaborate with them openly. Rufai in his work 
stated that out of the twelve Emirs from the former Sokoto empire imprisoned by the British 
after 1903 in Lokoja, six were affiliated with the Tijjaniyya Tariqa, only one with the Qadiriyya, 
another with the Mahdiyya, whereas four were not affiliated with any Sufi brotherhood (Rufai 
1986: 155).  
The growing influence and acceptance of the Tijjaniyya Tariqa can be understood 
within the context of the internal development of Kano during that period. Many religious 
scholars condemned the new habits practised after the British conquest, for instance increas-
ing consumption of alcohol and  the use of the English language as a means of communica-
tion. All these innovations were regarded as signs of an increasing westernization of the 
young, not to mention the new institutions of education and administration where a new 
generation of Malaman Gwamnati (Islamic scholars that tow the official line) clerks were being 
raised (Anwar 1989: 29).  
Until his death, Ibrahim Inyas was the leader of the Tijjaniyya Tariqa in Nigeria though 
he himself was a Senegalese. Since then no scholar in Nigeria has achieved such an uncon-
tested authority as a leader of the whole Tariqa in Nigeria. A multitude of locally competing 
networks emerged after the death of Inyas. The centers of power presently within the Tijjani-
yya are grouped essentially around the following: In Kano, the scholar-trader Isyaku Rabiu is 
the leader, though some factions dispute his claim. Besides him, there is also Khalifa Ismaila 
Ibrahim. Outside of Kano, in Kaduna there is Dahiru Bauchi who originally was based in 
Bauchi, but the Tijjaniyya members persuaded him to move to Kaduna in order to counter the 
influence of the late spiritual leader of the Izala movement, Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi. 
Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi from time to time now takes up residence in Kano, most probably to 
also counter the teachings of another anti-Tariqa Islamic scholar, Dr Ahmad Ibrahim Bamba, 
whose public teachings has gained tremendous acceptance in Kano in the past nine years. In 
Maiduguri, there is a network under the leadership of Ibrahim Salih and Al-Miskin. The 
breakup of the Tijjaniyya Tariqa since the late 1960s into numerous competing networks on 
the one hand and the death of Kabara with the subsequent imposition of his young son over 
older scholars as the Khalifa (heir) of the Qadiriyya has thrown the two Tariqas into a serious 
crisis. This crisis was made worst with the formation of the Izala movement.  
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The Jama’at Izalatil Bid’a Waiqamatus Sunnah (movement against negative innova-
tions and for orthodoxy) was formed by the late Ismaila Idris and Bala Sirajo in 1978 in Jos, 
Plateau state. It was the first time that an organization of this magnitude had been formed 
without the assistance of popular scholars in the country or among the traditional rulers 
(Gumi 1992: 158). The Izala (as it popularly came to be known) was from its formation an 
anti-Tariqa group with its aim the revitalization (tajdid) of the religion of Islam and its mem-
bership made up mainly of youths wanting to unite Muslims, in accordance with the true 
teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith. Izala’s influence spread rapidly especially in Northern 
Nigeria. As a consequence of its teachings people began to question the thoughts of the 
Tariqa leaders. What is more, youths were rebelling against the religious positions of their 
parents, a situation which continues till today. Prominent amongst its leaders are: Ismaila 
Idris (Jos, now late), Mallam Bawa Maishinkafa (Jos, now late), Mallam Abdullahi Pakistan 
(Kano State) and Mallam Yakubu Musa Hassan (Katsina State).  
The pro-state groups have a close and cordial relationship with the government 
which involves these associations or their leaders in almost all of its activities and programs. 
Furthermore the State makes use of these associations to legitimize its programs or projects 
and in times of social crises or ethnic/religious conflicts by getting the leaders to speak to the 
people on the issues involved through the mass media and other communal forums or during 
the Friday sermons in mosques. In addition the government involves the leaders of the tradi-
tional religious associations in almost all its committees set up and most especially those on 
questions of Hajj (pilgrimage), the Zakkat and the Shariah. These religious leaders enjoy 
perquisites from being members of these state committees by way of financial benefits, free 
trip to Makkah during pilgrimage with allowances paid in hard currency. In addition they enjoy 
state largesse during the religious festivities and Ramadan (fasting) periods. The state dis-
tributes to religious leaders (especially those that have a cordial relationship with the state or 
state actors) rams, rice, milk, sugar and other beverages. It is little wonder that these leaders 
are referred to in the community as ‘Malaman Gwamnati’ i.e. government spokesmen. During 
military regimes these religious leaders (especially during Babangida’s regime 1985-93) 
received gifts of Peugeot 505 new cars and cash, all in an attempt to build legitimacy espe-
cially at the peak of the regime’s endless transition program. The relationship between these 
associations and the State is therefore one of cooperation and cooptation. These associa-
tions hardly engage in the developmental projects in the community. 
The other side of the dualism of Islamic civic association is the radical and anti-state 
associations. Within this group there are variations in their relationship to the State. Often the 
issue at stake is what determines their method of engagement. For instance, groups such as 
the Muslim Brothers (Shi’a) and Jama’at Tajdidul Islam tend to always have conflictual rela-
tions with the State. They question the legitimacy of the government to the extent of claiming 
not to recognize it. However, associations like Sabilur Rashad Islamic Association, and Usman 
Bin Affan Islamic Association for instance, cooperate with the government and accept their 
offers of assistance or from State institutions/agencies (teaching materials or renovation of 
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classes in their schools), while on the other hand being critical over what they see as non-
implementation of the Shariah or the seeming reluctance of the State to vigorously enforce 
the Shariah dogma. These associations intervene and establish their programs or projects 
from the perspective of Islam. Most associations in this category are involved in developmen-
tal programs or intervene in social fields ranging from providing assistance to the needy and 
disadvantaged groups, such as widows and orphans. They visit the sick in hospitals most 
especially hospitals with indigenous patients, rehabilitation centers and prisons, the aim 
being to provide comfort to the sick and inmates who have no relatives in the city. Groups 
that are very prominent in this aspect include Al-Birr, Sabilur Rashad, and Usman Bin Affan 
Islamic Trust. 
It is in the area of education where the visibility and vibrancy of these associations 
are most felt. Groups such as Da’awah, Sabilur Rashad Islamic Center, Usman Bin Affan Trust, 
Bilal Islamic Center, Masjid Sahaba, Hudaibiyya Islamic Center and Muslim Sisters Organiza-
tion exhibit more of the features of secular modes in their structure, orientation and activities 
(building of schools for women, literacy work and advocacy. They support girl-child education, 
organize seminars on scientific discoveries as they affect or relate to Islam e.g. cloning of 
human beings). 
Another area of conflict between most groups and the government is where the ful-
crum should be. Advocacy is really touchy as far as the State is concerned especially on 
questions over good governance and accountability, the clamor for Shariah dogma or the 
issues of secularism and human rights abuses. Usman Bin Affan, for instance, is the most 
consistent and articulate group in calling for good governance, transparency and the ac-
countability by public officers. The leader of the association Ja’afar Mahmoud Adam advo-
cates for fair representation in appointment into political offices and for elected representa-
tives to ensure good governance and transparency in their official duties. These groups 
advocated for the electorates in the 2003 election, to vote only for candidates that would 
implement the Shariah fully and they also threatened to sponsor candidates to contest for 
political office in the 2003 elections. Though no religious group had sponsored any candidate 
during the last elections, it is interesting to note that the person who was elected as governor 
of Kano, Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, is a person who enjoys tremendous support from Islamic 
groups. He is known to belong to a number of Islamic organizations such as Hudaibiyya 
Islamic foundation where he is on the board of directors and is a patron of both the Muslim 
Students Society (MSS) of Nigeria and of the Muslim Corpers Association of Nigeria, the Kano 
branch. In addition, he is also on the governing board of the National Islamic Center, Zaria, 
whose governor is on the board of trustees of the Islamic Development Network of Nigeria. 
Islamic groups have therefore played a major role in the past elections especially in the 
gubernatorial and presidential elections where they overtly campaigned for the candidates 
they supported and also acted as pooling agents for their candidates. Members of the Hisbah 
(see below) overlooked and escorted the ballot boxes right up to Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) offices to ensure that they were not tampered with. The radical 
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Islamic groups demonstrated their newfound engagement in political activities by arguing that 
governance of the society should not be left to be destroyed by irreligious and morally bank-
rupt politicians and bad governance. These groups also attack secularism and what they say 
as the “satanic” character of the State. These and similar methods of advocacies are what 
bring the State and these associations into conflicts. In the past, these disparities took on 
violent traits resulting in the State resorting to using violence to suppress these groups and 
run them underground. The Abacha regime for instance hunted and killed many of the mem-
bers of Jama’at Tajdid group. The leader of the Muslim Brothers Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and 
some of his followers were incarcerated only to regain their freedom after the death of 
Abacha in 1998.  
The radical Islamic groups also advocate girl-child education and women empower-
ment (through education). These associations have made a major breakthrough in women's 
education through training and encouraging women preachers and teachers to become 
acquainted with Islamic knowledge and the translation of the Qur’an. It is interesting to note 
that the State, in this instance, is supportive of the efforts of these associations in those 
areas, while the traditional religious groups, the conservative Ulama and a conservative 
section of the community are against such efforts. Some conservative husbands are known to 
have divorced their wives for attending such schools.  
The radical Islamic associations also play a major role in settling domestic disputes 
between marriage partners especially as urbanization has disconnected people from their 
traditional communities. In Kano, a commercial town with a large number of migrants, strong 
efforts are made in resolving domestic quarrels, especially so if one or both parties are 
members/followers of these associations. These associations even arrange marriages, 
whereby interested persons send a letter to the leader of the association stating his/her wish. 
The leader then announces this to the members, usually during class sessions. and inter-
ested candidate(s) are then asked to see the leader for more information. Most of those 
seeking help tend to be women. This may be owing to the fact that the traditional method of 
matchmaking is no longer possible as a result of urbanization, and the fact that culturally, 
women in the society, unlike men, do not have the freedom to mix freely with men or to be 
very visible.  
It is important to acknowledge the fact that most of the radical Islamic associations 
were formerly linked to the Izala Movement, which was the most vibrant and expanding Is-
lamic religious movement in the 1970s and 1980s (Gumi 1992, Chafe 1992, Sulaiman 1985 
and Loimeier 1997). The late Malam Ismaila Idris (an ex-service man), Malam Sidi Ali Sokoto 
and Malam Abubakar Tureta founded Izala in the city of Jos, in 1978. The Izala movement 
started its activities initially as an anti-Sufi/anti-Tariqa organization. It advocated a return to 
the true teachings of Islam and rejected all religious innovations and mysticism, which are the 
main objectives of the Tariqa/Sufi brotherhoods. During the 1980s, the Izala expanded its 
Islamic platform, spreading to all the Northern Nigerian cities and towns. The Izala was re-
sponsible for securing educational sponsorship for a number of the students that were ex-
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pelled from institutions of higher learning, particularly from the Ahmadu Bello University, 
during the 1978 students demonstrations (Chafe 1992:12).  
The Izala pioneered the cause for radical approaches to Islamic scholarship. It puts 
more emphasis on relevant questions and encourages social analyses with the intention to 
expose contradictions arising from customary practices, which, more often than not, compli-
cate simple religious modes on social conducts. What is meant here is that the Izala group 
advocates for a return to true Islamic practices and discourses rather than resorting to mysti-
cism, saint worship, incantations and religious liturgies which the Tariqa/Sufi brotherhoods 
encourage. Furthermore the Izala leaders accuse the Tariqa leaders of discouraging their 
followers from asking probing questions and added that the attitude of the Tariqa leaders 
discourages scholarship. The Izala aims to eradicate religious innovations (bid’a), i.e. to do 
away with all non-orthodox Islamic ways of life by promoting a return to the interpretation 
based solely on the Qur’an and Sunnah (teachings of the prophet Muhammad). The late 
austere Saudi Islamic scholar Sheikh Abdulwahab influenced the Izala movement, thus the 
Tariqa followers call them Wahabiyawa (followers of Abdulwahab). In Nigeria the late Islamic 
scholar sheikh Abubakar Gumi was Izala’s role model and spiritual leader though he was not 
a member of the group. The main objective of the Izala was and still is to disqualify Sufi 
scholars operating within the confines of the Tijjaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods and the 
Muslim Brothers (Shi’ites).  
In the early 1990s there was a split within the Izala group between those who went 
abroad, in particular to the universities of Madinah (Jami’at Islamiyya) and Makkah, and the 
Izala leaders at home. The bone of the contention was on certain pronouncements or fatawa, 
i.e. legal opinions given by an alim (an Islamic scholar) pertaining to Islamic law, which the 
returnees felt were wrong. They called for revision or abrogation of these fatawa, interpreta-
tions and ideas and for those concerned and others who do not share the movement’s per-
ceptions excommunication or apostasy (takfur). Most important, the returnees are generally 
more articulate and have a large following amongst the Muslim Ummah. The former and some 
dissident groups were being forced to accept the schism and therefore left and founded 
groups such as Usman Bin Affan Islamic Trust, Sabilur Rashad Islamic Center, etc. These 
groups were more concerned with issues of development of the Muslim Ummah through 
education, women and men literacy programs, social provisioning, and advocacy for  good 
governance. It should be noted though, that they also engage the Tariqa and Muslim Broth-
ers (Shi’ites) in debates condemning their practices but unlike the Izala group they do not 
make this their sole objective.     
Another important feature of the Islamic civic associations is in the area of security and 
provision of relief and assistance in the event of disaster or outbreak of disease. Their First Aid 
Groups (yan agaji) activities were transferred, with the introduction of Shariah, to Hisbah Groups. 
In the past the Aid Groups generally concerned themselves with giving first aid in times of disas-
ter, assisting potential pilgrims at the airports and in Makkah (some members are sponsored by 
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the State to Makkah to assist pilgrims), directing traffic and acting as security guards for vehicles 
during Friday prayers, public lectures or religious gatherings.  
The introduction of Shariah in the year 2000 resulted in the formation of Hisbah as it 
took over all the activities of the Aid Groups and in addition, sought and received an expanded 
mandate. The guidelines on the arrangement, functions and operations of Hisbah outlined in the 
mandate of Hisbah, thus:  
 
“to uphold justice and equality, uphold brotherhood of faith, advocate against interest, 
usury, hoarding and speculations, to encourage deeds of charity, advocate on the impor-
tance of marriage institution and to redeem the institution from western influence, preach 
kindness to animals and to advocate for quest for knowledge.” (Guidelines; 2000:6-9) 
 
With the formation of the Hisbah security and crime emerged as major issues in which these 
groups attempted to get involved, but to address the question of immoral life styles.  
The formation of Hisbah groups came as a result of the introduction of Shariah. It was 
civil society groups especially religious groups that came together and formed Hisbah groups in 
communities and local government areas to support and facilitate Shariah implementation (Inter-
view Mallam Rabiu Afghani, Jan. 2003 and Mallam Rabo Abubakar, Jan. 2003). When the State 
realized that the initiative had been taken from it, it quickly mobilized, using prominent and tradi-
tional ulama to call for a unified Hisbah. The State began by setting up a committee, which drew 
up guidelines for the operation of Hisbah with rules and regulations governing membership, 
mandate and a modus operandi, etc. The State’s aim was to control the proliferation of Hisbah 
groups, which were functioning in earnest. The criteria that were used by the committee to select 
members of Hisbah were seen by people, especially by religiously conscious and radical Islamic 
groups, as an attempt to deny them the right to belong to Hisbah and as an attempt by the State 
to take control of Hisbah activities. The result of this was the organisation of ‘independent’ Hisbah 
by groups that were not recruited by the State selection committee and others who chose not to 
have anything to do with the State Hisbah, viewing them as organs of the State.  
The formation of the ‘independent’ Hisbah may also be a result of the general suspicion 
by Islamic civil society members of the State’s perceived weak commitment towards Shariah 
implementation. In the state of Zamfara for instance, there is no ‘independent’ Hisbah, but just 
the State Hisbah groups. The main reason for this is that whereas Shariah implementation in 
Zamfara was controlled by the state, that of Kano was conducted by Islamic civil societies. These 
‘independent’ Hisbah groups in Kano have on several occasions accused the State and the police 
of not cooperating with them, for instance they contend that whenever they report any anti-social 
activity to the police, the latter would find one reason or the other so as not to accompany them 
to make arrest. They also accuse the State of not assisting individual Hisbah officials or members 
who, in the course of carrying out their duties, get into trouble with either the community or 
criminal elements. The government Hisbah, on the other hand, they argue, does not encounter 
these problems. For instance, at the height of the Shariah implementation drive, the government 
Hisbah organized a raid on brothels and beer parlours in the state with full support from the 
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police, and even the Deputy Governor of the state went with them. This clearly proved the ‘inde-
pendent’ Hisbah’s accusations that the State is biased in favour of the ‘official’ Hisbah groups.  
There are a number of differences between the two groups of Hisbah. 
 
1. In terms of commitment, the zeal to carry out its activities and vibrancy demonstrated 
by the ‘independent’ Hisbah is higher than that of the government Hisbah.  
 
2. In terms of the character of the leadership of the two groups, the government Hisbah 
is made up mainly of pro-state ulama, ex-public servants, pro-state community leaders 
and has a female ex-public servant at the apex. By contrast, the ‘independent’ Hisbah 
has a leadership that is not pro-state, independent, young and whose means of liveli-
hood is generally in the informal sector.  
 
3. With regard to recruitment and membership procedures, the government Hisbah is 
more formal and less public, while recruitment into the ‘independent’ Hisbah is less 
rigid and more open. In the government Hisbah an allowance is given by the State to 
its members, as well as for the maintenance of offices and logistics. Furthermore, it is 
easier (from the state’s point of view) to control and monitor a small organization lo-
cated at particular areas in the community. Although the ‘independent’ Hisbah is finan-
cially weak, it has offices in thousands of communities within and outside Kano city, 
which makes it extremely difficult to monitor and coordinate the activities of each com-
munity by the headquarters.  
 
4. Another area of difference between the state and the ‘independent’ Hisbah is in the 
composition of their board of directors and the management committees. Nine out of 
the 15 members of the state Hisbah board are government appointees including the 
chairman, and its management committee members are senior government officials or 
from the intermediary supporting staff. By contrast, the ‘independent’ Hisbah has a 
board and management committee that is made up solely of civil society members.  
 
Vigilante groups (community policing) is another issue that the ‘independent’ Hisbah groups have 
problems with. They argue that whereas vigilante groups are encouraged by the state (providing 
them with torch lights, rain boots for patrol work and police cooperation) to arrest criminals and 
anti-social elements in the society, the same state prohibits their members to do the same. This 
they see as a case of double standards. This is why some of the ‘independent’ Hisbah groups are 
prepared to make arrest or physically disperse social gatherings that they feel are not Shariah 
compliant and thus face the consequences thereafter. Two examples will suffice. In March 2003 
the chairman of the ‘independent’ Hisbah committee Mallam Rabo Abubakar threatened to sue 
the Kano State police command for attempted murder of one of its members in the cause of 
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carrying out Hisbah activities3. In June 2003 dozens of ‘independent’ Hisbah members stormed 
the Hotoro police station in Kano in an attempt to free members arrested by the police for alleged 
trespass and disturbance of public peace. The incident that led to the arrest of the Hisbah mem-
bers followed the storming of a wedding ceremony in Hotoro by Hisbah members following what 
they called anti-Shariah practice4. 
 
Notwithstanding the differences between the two groups of Hisbah, they however share 
certain commonalities.  
 
1. They are all guided by the same principle or motto, which is taken from the Qur’an: 
‘let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining 
what is right, and forbidding what is wrong’ . (Al-Imran: 104).  
 
2. Both groups adopt similar approaches towards stopping anti-social activities 
through community policing. Both groups recognize the fact that their roles are not 
solely in making arrests but to advocate against anti-social behaviours such as 
drug abuse, illicit sexual behaviour, prostitution etc.  
 
3. They all subscribe to a three-pronged strategy of stopping anti social behaviours. 
The first step is to use polite advocacy, as a means of stopping anti-social behav-
iour to the parties involved, for example, drug abusers. Where pleading fails the 
second strategy is to inform the police. The last option is to physically disperse or 
arrest the culprits. It should be noted that it is on using this last option that the ‘in-
dependent’ Hisbah gets into trouble with the community, the police (as they at-
tempt to stop a social function) or culprits (drug abusers especially youths). It is 
also that option that is very contentious between the Hisbah on the one hand and 
the police and state functionaries on the other. Whereas the police will argue that 
Hisbah has no mandate to make arrest, the Hisbah argues that after following the 
process of stopping anti-social activities as outlined above they have the mandate 
to make arrest or to physically disperse celebrations that are not Shariah compli-
ant. The chairman of the ‘independent’ Hisbah stated that the police command re-
fuses to make any arrest on the sale of alcohol because according to him “the 
Kano police command encourages the sale of alcohol by assigning policemen to 
escort vehicles that transport alcohol into the state”. 
 
                                                          
3 Daily Trust, March 19, 2003: 23 
4 The Triumph, June 5, 2003: 1 
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4. Both the state Hisbah and the ‘independent’ Hisbah encourage polygamy and see 
monogamy as the cause of prostitution. For instance, the guidelines of the forma-
tion, functions and operations of Hisbah stated thus:  
 
“… the adherents, especially the women in Hisbah must embark on re-orientation 
of women on virtues of polygamy … they should counter the western tendency 
and propaganda that view polygamy as outdated … this action, besides being 
unlawful, it creates extra-marital relations, prostitution and excessive emotional 
strains and stress on the teeming pious spinsters.” (Guidelines 2000: 9) 
 
The above position explains the reason why almost all Islamic civic associations, irrespective 
of whether they are conservative or radical, are suspicious of any program on reproductive 
health be it birth-spacing, family planning, women’s reproductive rights, maternal health etc. 
Any undertakings on these issues are thus seen as western/Jewish conspiracy against Islam.  
 
The leaders of Islamic civic associations are distinguished by a number of features  
 
1. Almost all the leaders of the radical groups are university graduates with advanced 
degrees and in one or two cases holding PhDs (Dr. Abdullahi Jibrin of Sabilur 
Rashad Islamic Group, Ja’afar Mahmoud Adam and Sheikh Abdulwahab of Usman 
Bin Affan Islamic Trust, and Dr. Aminudeen Abubakar of Da’awah Group). 
 
2. The leaders of radical Islamic associations access the Internet and have no inhibi-
tions to watching cable stations. It is little wonder that in their sermons on Fridays, 
during class sessions or during advocacy sessions (public lecture) they tend to be 
well informed on any area they decide to speak on.  
 
3. Radical Islamic civic associations exhibit the tendency of being multi-focused 
thereby taking on multiple subjects ranging from education, social provisioning, ad-
vocacy, arranging marriages to settling domestic disputes. By contrast, the tradi-
tional Islamic associations mainly focus on proselytization within their close ranks, 
teaching of liturgies and the virtues of saint worship. They also occasionally get in-
volved in conflict resolution (most of the time on the invitation of the State). Tariqa 
leaders are also involved in giving legitimacy to government programs especially 
those that tend to be controversial, i.e. the current anti-polio immunization of chil-
dren (see below). 
 
4. Among radical Islamic associations there are groups that are always in conflict with 
the State. It is also significant to note that these groups tend to be more con-
cerned with political issues. Muslim Brothers and Jama’at Tajdid fall into this cate-
gory. Furthermore, their acceptance in the community is weak; their strongest base 
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is in tertiary institutions and the cosmopolitan areas in the community. In addition 
Muslim Brothers are seen in the community, as being Shi’a followers while the ma-
jority of the Muslim community are Sunni followers. By contrast, the traditional as-
sociations, especially the Tariqa brotherhoods, are located in the old city. The 
Qadiriyya has its headquarters in Gidan Qadiriyya and the Kabara's quarters is 
close to the Emir’s palace. The Tijjaniyya has its headquarters located in the vicinity 
of their leader's house i.e. Sheikh Isyaku Rabiu. Since the death of Uba Ringim 
(leader of Tijjaniyya in Nigeria) in 1999 the group has been embroiled in leader-
ship crises with some factions aligning with Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi and another 
group supporting Sheikh Isyaku Rabiu. The Isyaku Rabiu group has more support-
ers, perhaps because Isyaku Rabiu is not only an Islamic scholar, he is also a very 
wealth businessman. In addition he is an indigene of Kano and resides in Kano city. 
On the other hand Dahiru Bauchi is from Bauchi town (Northeast) and resides in 
Kaduna. The other radical associations, which are generally non-violent, have their 
headquarters outside the old city where their activities are generally conducted. 
This is not unconnected to the conflict-ridden relationship between followers of the 
Tariqa brotherhoods on the one hand and these associations on the other hand. 
The Tariqa followers see those groups as pretenders and rabble-rousers while the 
radical group condemns the Tariqa for what it sees as its penchant for saint wor-
shiping and deviations from the teachings of true Islam. Hardly would these groups 
meet without engaging in violence. The old city is generally more conservative, and 
radical groups are not given the leverage to operate there. At the same time, many 
of the youths from the old city are followers of the radical associations. Several 
young men have had serious disagreements with their parents as a result of their 
being members of the radical associations or attending their activities.  
 
5. In terms of membership, the traditional associations tend to attract older and con-
servative people and consequently their leadership is equally made up of old peo-
ple. By contrast, the radical associations attract the young and middle aged of all 
classes and statuses but also the progressive elites. Their membership is made up 
of persons in their late 30s and early 40s.  
 
6. In terms of their internal structure, the traditional associations can hardly be called 
democratic. They have life-time leaders, and whenever these leaders die their sons 
are pronounced their heirs. This situation is very common amongst the Tariqa 
brotherhoods and expectedly provides a major source of friction and factionaliza-
tion within these groups. The radical associations have fairly democratic practices. 
Committees run these associations and most of them have board mem-
bers/advisers, western educated and in some cases with leading government bu-
reaucrats in their ranks.  
 
Tahir Haliru Gwarzo 
 
 
 
 
310 
 
7. Gender representation: In Kano there are very few women Islamic civic groups. 
Apart from Muslim Sisters Organization (MSO) one can hardly find another vibrant 
and visible group that is committed to women issues only. The MSO is an Islamic 
association that is membership and gender based and was formed about eight 
years ago. The MSO is a national association with its headquarters in Kano. Com-
mitted Islamic women activists run the association whose activities are centerd 
mainly on women's education, advocacy over women issues and social provisioning 
for disadvantaged women. The Federation of Muslim Women Association (FOM-
WAN) is a national association of Muslim women with the following aims: provide a 
forum for Muslim women’s views to be expressed at national and state levels, es-
tablish a framework for national cooperation and unity among women Islamic asso-
ciations, educate Muslim women in the teaching of Islam and encourage Muslim 
women to establish groups for educational purposes (Okunnu 2001: 5). Unlike the 
MSO, FOMWAN seems to exist only in name (as far as the Kano state is con-
cerned), as it is very difficult to locate its office and officials and much less to as-
sess its impact or activities. However, that some state branches of FOMWAN i.e. 
Kaduna and that of Kebbi are very vibrant, a reflections of the commitment and 
hard work of such state leaders. The Ansaruddeen group is an Islamic association 
of the Yoruba Muslim migrant community in Kano state. The association has a 
women wing, an appendage of the men's faction. Unlike Hausa Muslims, Yoruba 
Muslims have no problems with men and women belonging to the same association 
and even mixing socially. In terms of their activities and willingness to undertake 
developmental programs, the Ansaruddeen is by far the most successful. It raises 
ist finances from its members residing in as far off places as Europe. It is also one 
of the oldest Islamic associations in Nigeria. One could therefore say, that it is not 
rooted in the Kano community. The implication of the above therefore, is, that 
women's issues such as education, reproductive health and rights, economic and 
political empowerment and other social issues are left in the hands of the Muslim 
Sisters Organization, the comatose FOMWAN and a few male dominated radical Is-
lamic associations. 
 
Kano has very few international Islamic NGOs; apart from Al-Muntada Islamiyya and Ahmadi-
yya. Al-Muntada is an international Islamic NGO with headquarters in London employing both 
foreigners and Nigerians although a foreigner heads its office in Nigeria. Its Nigerian head-
quarters is in Kano from where it runs its activities which are mainly concentrated in the 
Northwest of Nigeria. These activities are limited to da’awah (inviting people to Islam), build-
ing mosques, Islamic schools and providing social provisions during the month of Ramadan. 
Al-Muntada employs Nigerian scholars and teachers to run their mosques and schools and 
the organization has on its payroll some Islamic preachers or da’iyah i.e., those who are 
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engaged in da’awah. These preachers are made to fill in claim forms on a monthly basis 
showing areas and activities executed. The Al-Muntada is viewed with suspicion and distrust 
by the Tariqa brotherhoods who consider the engagements of Al-Muntada as encouraging 
Wahabism and promoting a Saudi brand of Islam which, as was said earlier, theirs organisa-
tion opposes. Furthermore, the Tariqa groups accuse Al-Muntada of supporting the radical 
group’s version of Islam especially the Izala groups and their offshoots. It should be noted 
that Al-Muntada was founded by Saudi nationals studying abroad, and the suspicions of the 
Tariqa groups may well be true. Ahmadiyya Islamic association is another international NGO 
with presence in Kano. The group has very few followers because many regard it as being an 
un-Islamic group, due to the pronouncement of the association that its founder, Ahmad 
Gulam, is a prophet. To the average Muslim, this statement amounts to apostasy, as the 
belief amongst mainstream Islam believers is that the prophet Muhammad is the last mes-
senger of God. Notwithstanding this state of affairs, Ahmadiyya runs a hospital (commercial) 
and is patronized by the Muslim community and also has an excellent secondary school which 
is recognized as such by both the state and the Muslim community. While Al-Muntada’s activi-
ties are mainly centerd around da’awah (proselytization), those of the Ahmadiyya concen-
trate on the provisions of social services. Furthermore, Al-Muntada’s engagements serve 
both the Kano metropolis and the rural areas while Ahmadiyya’s activities are limited to 
Kano's capital.          
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The major characteristic of the social crisis in Kano is the precariousness of life. There is serious 
pressure on the modes of livelihood, both formal and informal. The breakdown of the social fabric 
and family bonds is producing a lumpen culture characterized by crime, drug abuses, violence, 
urban gangs and other similar vices. The conditions created by urbanization and social transfor-
mations have created ideal conditions for the proliferation of informal as well as formal Islamic 
civic associations and their need to provide many survival services, social, economic and medical 
support that neither the family can nor the state is providing in these times of crises.  
This article tried to underline that all Islamic civic associations strive to see and are 
involved in improving the life of the Muslim Ummah by increasing prosperity and supporting 
the Shariah being fully implemented in the state, even though having differing interpretations 
and emphases. For instance the Muslim Brothers would like to see an Iranian model being 
installed, while the Radical groups would have no problems with politicians who urge the 
return to the traditional Shariah. The Tariqa groups would prefer their leaders to be in the 
driving seat for the return to Shariah. This was why when the radical groups forced ex-
governor Kwankwaso to declare the implementation of Shariah in Kano, Tariqa leaders con-
demned it as “Izala Shariah”. We should note however that at no time did any group in Kano 
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state ever criticize the need to return to Shariah. What is at issue is the means and methods 
of achieving such a state and the precise models. For instance, the Muslim Brothers complain 
that politicians who are not Islamic scholars cannot bring about Shariah and they support 
their positions by citing the Sokoto Jihad which was led by the Islamic scholar Usman Bin 
Fodio.  
Furthermore, the article has described the different relationships that Islamic groups 
have with the state. For the pro-state groups for instance, cooperation or cooptation with the 
State seems to be their chosen path and their methods of advocacy are always conciliatory. 
By contrast, within the radical groups some chose to allow the issue to determine their posi-
tion; they would, for instance, cooperate with the state in the area of educational develop-
ment, civic duties and other social services but will be against the state when it comes to 
issues of good governance and transparency, corruption and be scathing in their criticism of 
the State over non-implementation or luke-warm approach towards Shariah implementation. 
Other groups such as Muslim Brothers and Jama’at Tajdid have always found cause to be 
anti-state, and their relationship with the State is characterized by conflict and confrontation. 
Their form of advocacy is usually combative and their instruments have equally varied, from 
bloody clashes between, for instance, the State and Muslim Brothers or Jama’at Tajdidul 
Islam writing advertorials in newspapers/press releases, for instance Hausawa Muslim Forum 
on the ‘Miss World Beauty Pageant’.  
All Islamic groups in the state would like to see social changes in the society but the 
question is: What direction are the changes going to take, and, conversely, who will bring 
about the Islamic state?  It should be noted that despite the differences amongst Islamic 
groups and their followers no group or their followers has ever stated that it is opposed to 
living under either an Islamic state or to be governed by the Shariah. This is because one 
cannot call oneself a Muslim unless one subscribes to the tenets of Shariah which can only be 
fully implemented in an Islamic state. Therefore, what is debatable amongst Islamic groups is 
the issue of strategy or method of bringing about the Islamic state and being governed by 
Shariah. 
 The desire of the ultra-radical groups such as the Muslim Brothers to see an Iranian 
type of revolution has led the organization into violent confrontation with the State with the 
resultant blood shed. Other radical groups such as Izala and their co-travellers are also 
advocates for an Islamic state but they expect the State or a populist government/leaders to 
bring about this change. This is demonstrated by these groups agitating and promoting 
individual politicians whom they see as being pro-Shariah. These groups see the Saudi model 
as more ideal rather than the Iranian example, probably due to the fact that most of their 
leaders have studied at universities in Makkah, Madinah, Egypt and Pakistan – all Sunni 
states. At any rate, these leaders and indeed the majority of the Nigerian Muslim population 
are also Sunni followers.  
On the part of the Tariqa brotherhoods it is really problematic to understand how the 
Islamic state will crystallize, because for them, neither the Iranian nor the Saudi models are 
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ideal. First, the Iranian model does not appeal to them simply because the Tariqa followers 
are Sunni. Secondly, because the Tariqa is pro-state they do not subscribe to the Muslim 
Brothers method of operation and their anti-state stance. Thirdly, though Tariqa followers are 
Sunni like the other radical groups and the Saudis, they are at the same time anti-Saudi 
because of what they call Wahabism and the Saudis support of the radical groups and most 
importantly the Saudis disagreement over saint worshiping, which is a cardinal principle of 
Tariqa. Fourthly, the Tariqa’s spiritual centers are based in Baghdad (Qadiriyya), Kaolack in 
Senegal and the Maghreb (Tijjaniyya). These are countries that are not Islamic states or 
governed by Shariah law. They are secular states and, therefore, the Tariqa brotherhoods 
tend to be silent as to which model of an Islamic state they are advocating. Their call for an 
Islamic state is thus always made in a vacuum. In fact at the height of the Shariah discussions 
and the demands by Islamic civic associations in Kano, the Tariqa leaders were scathing in 
their criticism of what they call ‘Izala Shariah’. What the Tariqa leaders mean is that the 
Shariah was being interpreted to the understanding of the Izala/radical groups. However the 
radical Islamic groups were the main force behind the pressure that was exerted on the 
former governor Kwankwaso to introduce the Shariah to the state. 
One could safely conclude that apart from the ultra-radical Muslim Brothers no other 
group has a clear and articulate position on the direction of these social changes and who is 
to be the vanguard of the Islamic state projects. Actually only the Muslim Brothers seem to 
have recognized the fact that it is necessary to take over the state machinery, army, police 
and judiciary for the Shariah to be fully enforced and that it cannot be implemented on the 
basis of promises by politicians whose mandates are limited. This may be the reason why only 
the Muslim Brothers have not come out to support states that have adopted the Shariah. 
What is more the Muslim Brothers consider the whole Shariah project to be untimely and 
strategically faulty, especially its hudud (criminal) aspects in those states. (see interview of 
Zakzaky in Al-Mizan 14 Jumada Akhir No. 378: 4 and M. Turi’s public lecture at Talatar 
Mafara, Zamfara State, on 27 August 1999, Ibid: 12). The Muslim Brother’s conceptualize 
the  Shariah as an entity i.e. the Shariah is to be implemented in the whole country because 
what is envisaged is an Islamic revolution in Nigeria, not to be constrained by state bounda-
ries. By contrast, other groups conceive the Shariah being applied only to Muslims in those 
states that have adopted the Shariah law, and at the same time they advocate it as appropri-
ate to Muslims even in states where it has not been adopted, a notion not given much atten-
tion. One could attempt to explain the position of the other Islamic groups as preferring a 
gradual approach to bring about an Islamic state rather than through a violent revolution. 
This approach may also explain the other group’s understanding and appreciation of the 
concrete situation or reality of the plurality of the Nigerian nation by recognizing the fact that 
Nigeria as an Islamic state is not feasible. 
Despite the numerous differences among them, Islamic civic associations in Kano 
share certain commonalities. 
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1. Most Islamic civic associations suffer from lack of adequate resources. They all 
tend to rely on handouts from wealthy members or sympathizers and other forms 
of non-institutionalized philanthropy. Though the radical groups charge tuition fees 
in their schools and for literacy programs the fees are far too low and the rate of 
default in payments is very high. This attitude by parents and the community re-
flects the traditional culture of purporting that Islamic education and its activi-
ties/programs should be free or charity work. This impacts negatively on the capac-
ity, sustainability and performance of the associations.  
 
2. Another point of commonality is that of gender representation, or rather the lack of 
it. Islamic civic associations irrespective of their principles or objectives are com-
pletely male dominated associations.  
 
3. All Islamic civic associations see the national elites as disappointments for having 
failed to provide social welfare and education to the poor, and most important for 
not being transparent and accountable for their actions. They have become, in 
their eyes, the lackeys of westernization and secularism whose only achievement is 
the emasculation and exploitation of the citizens.  
 
4. All Islamic groups tend to avoid discussing health issues such as family planning, 
safe sex, reproductive rights, abortion, HIV/AIDS and sensitivities on reproductive 
health beyond the normal sermons against fornication and adultery. The few 
groups that do discuss reproductive health issues tend to link it up with what they 
call Jewish or western conspiracy to discourage Muslims from procreation through 
family planning. Some groups go as far as to discourage people from taking their 
children to the on-going polio vaccination centers, saying that it is an attempt to 
render the children impotent.  
 
5. Another area of commonality of Islamic civic associations in Kano concerns their in-
ternal democratic structures The democratic credentials of almost all Islamic civic 
associations in Kano are suspect.  
 
6. The neglect of the media in communicating with those outside their circles. Apart 
from the ultra-radical groups which have newspapers (the Muslim Brothers with Al-
Mizan, the Jama’atul Tajdidul Islam with At-Tajdid), no other Islamic association in 
Kano has a periodical, newsletter or newspaper. Thus their potentials to reach out 
and extend their advocacies and also to correct the distorted pictures being por-
trayed of them by their adversaries are minimized. 
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7. More often than not, the recruiting of members or their socialization by Islamic as-
sociations is based on partisan considerations and not on the merits of the issues. 
The member is more biased towards the association than towards the truth. In a 
manner of speaking, he is not taught to think freely; rather, he is shackled by bi-
ased opinions and viewpoints (this is more pronounced amongst the Tariqa follow-
ers). This makes it difficult for him to deal openly with others, particularly those 
outside his own association or with non-Islamic minded persons because he is not 
trained to examine issues objectively.  
 
8. In terms of advocacy, Islamic associations tend not to crystallize or prioritize their 
demands. Most groups think that an immediate, totally perfect and a purified ver-
sion of Islam is achievable on demand. They confuse the mental belief in the totality 
of the message of Islam with the gradual application of its teachings in real-life 
situations.  
 
9. Almost all Islamic civic associations appear to stifle ideological dialogue. This is 
done on three levels, internally among its members, with other Islamic organiza-
tions and finally with non-Islamic groups, religious or secular. This resulted in nur-
turing utopian and idealistic concepts among its members and allowed theoretical 
and puritan ideas to remain untested for their practicality. This lack of dialogue 
produced a static intellectual atmosphere, which did not provide the enrichment 
needed for maturity within the associations. Concurrently, this stagnant atmos-
phere generated a lack of understanding among various factions in the society. 
 
We can in summary say that Islamic civil society actors are social agents that provide mean-
ing for the new and difficult conditions in the towns; new forms of bonding, and new social 
networks to supply comfort and emergency relief to those in distress. The Islamic civil society 
in Kano is an arena open to a wide range of participants and a broad spectrum of social 
projects.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Islamische zivilgesellschaftliche Vereinigungen sind führend bei den Bemühungen um die Wiederge-
winnung und -behauptung der Macht des Volkes in Nordnigeria. Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Staat 
und islamischen Vereinigungen sind vielschichtig; sie sind durch verschiedene Strömungen gekenn-
zeichnet. Radikale islamische zivilgesellschaftliche Vereinigungen können, zum Beispiel, auf einem 
Feld mit dem Staat zusammenarbeiten und ihn auf einem anderen Feld bekämpfen, ohne sich not-
wendigerweise zu kompromittieren. Islamische zivilgesellschaftliche Vereinigungen sind nicht in der 
Lage, sich selbst zu finanzieren, sie sind daher in der Tendenz auf die gelegentlichen, nicht institutio-
nalisierten Zuwendungen von Gönnern und dem Staat angewiesen. Entgegen der gängigen Auffas-
sung Auß enstehender erhalten diese Vereinigungen keine substantielle internationale oder bilaterale 
Finanzhilfe durch arabische Länder. Islamische zivilgesellschaftliche Vereinigungen setzen sich für die 
Stärkung legitimer Interessen der islamischen Gläubigen in Nord-Nigeria ein. Die Bandbreite der Akti-
vitäten reicht von der Stärkung von good governance über die Schulausbildung junger Mädchen bis 
zur Frauenfö rderung. Die zivilgesellschaftlichen Vereinigungen im Staat Kano besitzen weder die Mit-
tel noch die Ausbildung für die Ausübung sozialer und allgemeiner Verwaltungsaufgaben. Dennoch 
engagieren sich Gruppen wie die Hisbah sogar in der kommunalen Polizeiarbeit, indem sie bei der 
Verbrechensaufklärung mitwirken und damit die Rechtsstaatlichkeit erheblich fö rdern. Kritiker werfen 
der Hisbah jedoch Selbstjustiz vor, und sicher gibt es dazu ein Potenzial, wenn die notwendige Auf-
merksamkeit ausbleibt. 
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Nigeria (Nordwesten), Kano (Bundesstaat), Politischer Islam, Muslime, Verhältnis gesellschaftliche 
Gruppen-Staat, Religiö se Vereinigung, Nichtregierungsorganisation, Ziele/Programme von Instituti-
onen/Vereinigungen, Selbsthilfe (Soziale Gruppe), Islamisches Recht, Frauen, Kolonialpolitik  
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Résumé 
 
Les associations islamiques de la société civile sont à la tête des efforts entrepris pour redonner 
et asseoir le pouvoir du peuple dans le nord du Nigeria. Les relations entre l’Etat et ces associa-
tions islamiques sont complexes ; elles sont marquées par de nombreuses tendances. Les asso-
ciations islamiques radicales par exemple peuvent coopérer avec l’Etat dans certains domaines 
et le combattre dans d’autres sans nécessairement se compromettre. Les associations islami-
ques ne sont pas en mesure de s’autofinancer, elles doivent donc compter de temps à autre sur 
l’aide non institutionnalisée de bienfaiteurs et de l’Etat. Contre l’opinion courante, ces associa-
tions ne reçoivent pas d’aide financière substantielle, internationale ou bilatérale, provenant des 
pays arabes. Les associations islamiques luttent pour le renforcement des intérêts légitimes des 
croyants musulmans dans le nord du Nigéria. Le spectre de leurs activités s’étend de la good 
governance en passant par la formation scolaire des jeunes filles jusqu’au soutien des femmes. 
Les associations dans l’Etat de Kano n’ont ni les moyens et ni les qualifications pour exercer des 
tâches administratives courantes et sociales. Cependant des groupes comme les Hisbah 
s’engagent même dans le travail de la police communale en apportant leur aide à l’élucidation 
des délits. Ce faisant, ils renforcent considérablement l’Etat de droit. Néanmoins, certains leur 
reprochent de se faire justice eux-mêmes. Il y a un potentiel réel pour cela qui pourrait prendre 
le dessus si l’attention nécessaire faisait défaut. 
 
 
Mots-clé   
Nigeria (nord-ouest), Kano (Etat), islam politique, musulmans, relations entre groupes sociaux et 
Etat, association religieuse, organisation non-gouvernementale, objectifs/programmes d'institu-
tions/d'associations, autoassistance (politique de développement), droit islamique, femmes, politi-
que coloniale 
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